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THE INFLUENTIAL LEGACY OF DUTCH ISLAMIC 
POLICY ON THE FORMATION OF ZAKAT (ALMS) LAW 
IN MODERN INDONESIA 
Arskal Salim† 
Abstract: This article attempts to trace the influence of the colonial legacy in the 
formation of zakat (alms) policy in modern Indonesia.  The article argues that the 
influence of the Dutch Islamic policy has gradually diminished as the process of 
Islamization of Indonesia has deepened.  As early as the 19th century, Snouck Hurgronje 
played a key role in developing the Dutch zakat policy, which focused on the colonial 
government preventing the payment of zakat from being compulsory. 
During the first two decades after Indonesia's independence in 1945, the zakat 
policy as derived from colonial times continued without much change.  However, by the 
late 1960s, the New Order regime was leaning to familiarize and manipulate the 
institution of zakat.  In contrast to an assessment made by some scholars that President 
Soeharto's policy on Islam was consistent with Snouck Hurgronje's advice on Islamic 
affairs, this paper contends that Soeharto was not a skilled disciple of Snouck Hurgronje 
at all.  While Snouck Hurgronje attempted to prevent the colonial apparatus from being 
involved in encouraging Muslims to pay zakat, Soeharto, on the contrary, engaged 
himself in the task of zakat collection and thus made himself religiously responsible for 
organizing it properly.  Indeed, the level of Muslim devotion regarding their zakat 
obligation increased overall during the time of the New Order era, indicating an opposite 
effect to that advocated by Snouck Hurgronje.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Dutch Islamic policy on Indonesia throughout colonialization was 
largely shaped by the advice of one individual, Christian Snouck Hurgronje 
(1857-1936).  Snouck Hurgronje was considered an architect of the Dutch 
colonial efforts to manage Islamic developments its East Indies colony.  As 
pointed out by Harry J. Benda, Snouck Hurgronje distinguished the religious 
features from the political character of Islam.1 Snouck Hurgronje believed a 
policy of tolerance would best manage the growth of Islam in Indonesia, and 
would result in a measure of stability within the colony.  Such a tolerant 
attitude would also ensure that the principle of religious freedom enshrined 
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1
 Harry J. Benda, Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia, J. MODERN HIST., Dec. 1958, at 338, 342. 
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in the Dutch Constitution would be upheld.  Snouck Horgronje, however, did 
not extend this tolerant attitude to those utilizing religion for political means 
and purposes.  In contrast, he suggested that the colonial government take 
tough measures aimed at preventing the development of politico-religious 
endeavors.  In view of this, there were at least three objectives of the Dutch 
Islamic policy.  The first was to maintain security and order in the colony; 
the second was to ensure personal liberty concerning religious practices of 
Indonesian Muslims; and the third was to block the growth of Islam as a 
political movement as well as a predominate culture.2  
The independent Indonesian government was certainly affected by the 
colonial Islamic policy.  The question, however, is to what extent the 
government of Indonesia was influenced by colonial policy.  Despite 
conventional wisdom that Indonesia was strongly influenced by Hurgronje's 
Islamic colonial policy, this study contends the contrary.  I will argue here 
that President Soeharto, who ruled from 1966 to 1998 (popularly known as 
the New Order regime) was not really the skilled disciple of Snouck 
Hurgronje.3  While the effect of the Dutch policy was to discourage religious 
practice, the effect of Soeharto’s policy was to encourage greater religiosity.  
This contrast is evidenced by the respective zakat policies of the colonial 
and the New Order era.  
This article seeks to demonstrate that the colonial and the New Order 
policies on zakat had different motives.  These significant policy differences 
support the argument that Dutch Islamic policy had only a minor influence 
on the independent Indonesian government.  Official government policy 
toward zakat since the New Order era has changed significantly.  If the 
colonial policy on zakat was relatively successful in maintaining the low 
level of Muslim piety regarding their zakat obligation, a strong case can be 
made that the New Order’s zakat policy enhanced the level of Muslim 
devotion to pay the zakat.4 Unlike Snouck Hurgronje, who attempted to 
prevent the government apparatus from being involved in encouraging 
Muslims to pay zakat, President Soeharto engaged himself personally in the 
task of zakat collection and thus set a standard for many Indonesian Muslim 
citizens about exemplary Islamic piety.  Indeed, as a result of a more 
pronounced Islamization of Indonesia, the effect of the Dutch Islamic policy 
                                           
2
 See Aqib Suminto, POLITIK ISLAM HINDIA BELANDA (LP3ES, 1985).  
3
 See, e.g., W.F. Wertheim, INDONESIE VAN VORSTENRIJK TOT NEOKOLONIE, as quoted in Karel 
Steenbrink, DUTCH COLONIALISM AND INDONESIAN ISLAM: CONTACTS AND CONFLICTS 1596-1950 145, 
(Rodopi B.V., 1993). 
4
 See Taufik Abdullah, Zakat Collection and Distribution in Indonesia, in THE ISLAMIC 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Mohammed Ariff ed., 1991). 
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gradually diminished on the administration of zakat in particular.  A number 
of Islamic policies on zakat practice were developed in the late New Order 
era and became consolidated after the downfall of the Soeharto regime.   
The focus of this study is the involvement of state officials in the 
zakat administration during the colonial period and under an independent 
Indonesia.  It will examine the legacy of Dutch Islamic policy on the 
Indonesian government in its efforts to manage the zakat payments.  To this 
end, the second section will provide a brief overview of the practice of zakat 
in Islam and its incorporation into legal systems of some Muslim countries.  
The third section will discuss the Islamic practice of zakat during the 
colonial period while the fourth section will present the New Order’s policy 
on zakat.  The fifth section will not only identify the differences between the 
colonial and the New Order policies on zakat, but will also evaluate to what 
extent the impact of colonial policy is observable in the era of the Soeharto 
government.  The sixth section will assess whether the colonial legacy 
remains influential over the current practice of zakat in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia. 
II. ZAKAT:  ITS DEFINITION AND PRACTICE 
The lexicological meaning of zakat is “to purify.”  It also comes with 
the connotation of “growth” or “increase.”  Technically, zakat means to give 
up a fixed proportion of one’s wealth to certain determined recipients.5  
The accumulation of wealth is meant to be purified; thus zakat is both a kind 
of tax on wealth as well as a pious act (`ibadah).  Every Muslim who 
possesses or keeps certain liable assets such as gold, silver, jewelry, cash, 
livestock, or agricultural produce is to pay zakat for each one-year period of 
ownership of the asset.  The required duty amounts to 2.5 percent of the 
asset annually.  The exception to this is for agricultural produce, which is 
levied as a tithe.6 
In spite of its position as one of the five pillars of Islam, zakat perhaps 
is the religious duty least complied with by Muslim people.  This is due to 
the fact that there has been no consensus over the practice of zakat among 
Muslims anywhere and any time.  This is at least partially due to the fact that 
                                           
5
 Those entitled to receive zakat are listed in Q.S. 9:60 “The alms are only for the poor and the 
needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and 
the debtors, and the cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarers: a duty imposed by Allah. Allah is All-knowing, 
Wise.” 
6
 For further details see, for example, Farishta G. de Zayas, THE LAW AND PHILOSOPHY OF ZAKAT; 
THE ISLAMIC SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM (al-Jadidah Printing Press, 1960); Abdul Rehman Ansari, ZAKAAT, 
THE RELIGIOUS TAX OF ISLAM (Premier Press, 1973); Mahmoud Abu-Saud, FIQH AL-ZAKAT AL-MU`ASIR, 
(Oxford Publishing, 1989). 
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the Qur’an does not comprehensively arrange the issue of administration and 
enforcement of zakat.  In fact, there is no clear directive given as to whether 
to centralize, decentralize, institutionalize or personalize the application of 
zakat.  Although the Qur’an mentions eight recipients of zakat—of which a 
zakat agency (al-`amilin `alayha) is one7—there are no further instructions 
on how zakat should be collected, whether Muslims are obliged to pay their 
zakat to this agency, or whether they can voluntarily give their zakat directly 
to the poor and the needy. 
The collection of zakat differs substantially from one Muslim country 
to another.  While some countries have established a complete incorporation 
of zakat as a regular tax of the Islamic state (Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia), 
others utilize intermediary financial institutions to receive voluntary 
payments of zakat (Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Indonesia), and still 
others marginalize zakat to the individual’s private conscience (Morocco, 
Oman).8 Six Muslim countries—Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Sudan—regularly enforce the implementation of zakat.  Three 
of these have made a clear reference to the responsibility of the state for the 
implementation of zakat in their Constitutions.9 
III. ZAKAT DURING THE DUTCH COLONIAL ERA 
There is little information available to us regarding the Dutch colonial 
policy on zakat.  Most of this information is restricted to the island of Java 
and relies heavily on Snouck Hurgronje’s advisory correspondence10 
regarding the problems with zakat.  As an official advisor to the Office for 
Indigenous Affairs (Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken) from 1889 to 1906, 
Snouck Hurgronje advised the government of the Netherlands East Indies in 
various parts of Java on the zakat issue. 
                                           
7
 Q.S.9:60.  See supra note 5. 
8
 See Jonathan Benthall, Financial Worship: The Qur’anic Injunction to Almsgiving, J. ROYAL 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. (Mar. 1999), at 29; cf. A. Zysow, Zakat, in THE ENCYLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM (2002), 
at 420. 
9
 Article 10 of the Sudanese Constitution, Article 21 of the Yemeni Constitution and Article 31 of 
the Pakistani Constitution.  See Zysow, supra note  8, at 419. 
10
 These letters were compiled and edited by E. Gobee and C. Adriannse, AMBTELIJK ADVIEZEN VAN 
C. SNOUCK HURGRONJE 1889-1936, (1957) vol. II, chapter XXVIII on djakat en pitrah.  In this article, I am 
referring to its Indonesian version translated by Sukarsi, NASIHAT-NASIHAT C. SNOUCK HURGRONJE 
SEMASA KEPEGAWAIANNYA KEPADA PEMERINTAH HINDIA BELANDA 1880-1936, (INIS, 1992), at 1323-79 
(hereinafter NASIHAT-NASIHAT). 
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Some scholars have referred to this correspondence when discussing 
the collection and distribution of zakat in the colonial period.11 However, 
their discussions are limited and do not clearly illustrate how the Dutch 
zakat policy was implemented.  Despite a number of pages written by 
Hisyam to explain how zakat was managed under colonial rule, his focus 
was primarily the manner in which religious officials collected zakat in 
selected parts of Java rather then on the Dutch colonial policy in general.   
Likewise, it is surprising that although the work of Aqib Suminto dealt with 
the colonial policy on Islam, his brief discussion of zakat was confined to 
the issue of the funding of mosques.12   
Before delving into the Dutch policy on zakat, the following section 
will discuss the practice of zakat in early years of Islam in Indonesia, 
focusing on Java in particular.   
A. The Practice of Zakat in the Early Years of Islam in Indonesia 
Evidence of the institutionalization of zakat upon the arrival of Islam 
to Indonesia is sparse.  There is no indication that the institution of zakat was 
formally transformed into an official tax, regularly collected by a political 
entity of the Muslim kingdoms.  On the contrary, it appears that the practice 
of zakat was voluntary.  Snouck Hurgronje explained this situation by 
referring to the unique process of Islamization in Indonesia, where the 
religion of Islam was not forced upon the population by Arab conquest.  If 
Islam had been brought to the country by conquest, zakat likely would have 
become a political payment as a form of recognition for Arab rulers taking 
control of the territory.13  
Given the fact that mostly Arab traders and sufi travelers brought 
Islam to Indonesia through peaceful means, there was almost no Arabic 
kingdom founded as a result of this spread of Islam.14 Thus, it is unlikely 
that zakat was ever considered a form of Islamic taxation or levied for 
political payment in Indonesia.  More likely zakat payment was left to 
Muslims to hand over individually and voluntarily.  This would have meant 
that those who mastered Islamic knowledge, such as religious officials 
(lebe’, kaum, amil and modin at the village level, and penghulu and naib at 
                                           
11
 Steenbrink, supra note 3, at 227-28; Abdullah, supra note 4, at 57; Muhammad Hisyam, CAUGHT 
BETWEEN THREE FIRES: THE JAVANESE PANGULU UNDER THE DUTCH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 1882-
1942 111-20 (INIS, 2001). 
12
 Suminto, supra note 2.  
13
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10 at 1324-25.  
14
 Cf. Merle Ricklefs, HISTORY OF MODERN INDONESIA SINCE C. 1200 36-58 (Stanford University 
Press, 2001).  It must be noted, however, that there were some Arabs and other foreign individuals who 
served in the local Sultanate.  
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the higher level) and informal religious leaders (kiai, `ulama’, ajengan, etc.), 
were charged with collecting zakat.15 It is no wonder then that once a local 
Islamic kingdom was established, such jobs were left in the hands of those 
persons.   
Over time, as the local rulers became Muslim, they began to supervise 
and become involved in religious affairs such as the collection of zakat.  The 
intervention was merely to help religious officials collect the zakat payments 
from Muslim people.16 It is unlikely, however, that Muslim kingdoms in 
Java ever intended to establish official institutions to collect and to distribute 
zakat, let alone to force people to pay zakat.  There remains little, if any, 
evidence regarding how often the local Muslim rulers themselves paid zakat.  
As the zakat payments were irregularly practiced by the Muslim kings, it is 
plausible to state that they paid no special attention to the establishment of 
official institutions to collect zakat.  In fact, the records that are available to 
us are too obscure to make any initial judgments on the practice of zakat by 
the Muslim kings.  It is suspected that “at the time of the first organizing of 
Mataramese land under Senopati (c. 1590) or more probably under Sultan 
Agung (c. 1625), of each 25 cacahs (units) of land, one was reserved for the 
religious people, as waqf [endowment], perdikan-land, (thus) as a sort of 
zakat on behalf of the king [sic].”17 This vague information is still 
problematic, as the land itself is not liable to zakat.  Why then did the 
Mataram kings reserve land for zakat? What kind of wealth did the Mataram 
kings seek to purify by giving such land as zakat? Based on this, it might be 
said that the practice of zakat under the Muslim kingdoms in Java in 
particular was not officially organized in accordance with Islamic legal 
rules. 
Given the lack of an official administration of zakat by the Muslim 
political entity, it is probably safe to speculate that most shares of zakat fell 
to those `amil who were directly involved in collecting zakat (`amil were 
usually mosque organizers, or modin, naib or penghulu) and Qur’anic 
village teachers.  As the collected zakat gradually and mostly became the 
regular income of the local religious officials,18 only a small portion of it 
was given to those religiously entitled to a legitimate share, such the poor 
and the needy.  This was justified by the fact that, as appointed religious 
                                           
15




 G.P. Rouffaer, Vorstenlanden, in ADATRECHTBUNDELS, (1931), at 309.  I thank Merle Ricklefs for 
pointing out to me this particular piece of information and translating it from Dutch to be used here.  
18
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1325, 1347; Hisyam, supra note 11, at 117.  See also 
Steenbrink, supra note 3, at 227-28.  
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officials, the amil did not receive a salary from the ruler.  Some amounts of 
zakat funds, therefore, were claimed as their portions.19 The local rulers, 
such as heads of villages, also enjoyed a share of zakat measurable to the 
extent to which they helped with the collection of zakat.20 This practice 
continued up to the Dutch colonial times.  
B. Colonial Policy on the Practice of Zakat 
The Dutch Islamic policy of religious neutrality has not been free of 
criticism.  Aqib Suminto suggested that the colonial Islamic policy was 
biased and inconsistent, as the demarcation between toleration and 
interference was frequently vague and confusing.21 As early as 1882, the 
colonial government was closely involved in administrating the religious 
practices of Indonesian Muslims by facilitating the establishment of the 
Religious Court in Java.22  From this time, the colonial policy towards Islam 
as a religion was ambiguous at best.  In Suminto’s view it was unclear 
whether colonial interference was designed to assist or to impede the 
religious practices of Indonesian Muslims.  Indeed, as argued by Suminto, it 
appeared that implicit in this Islamic policy was an agenda of de-
Islamization; that is, a desire to impede the growing religious awareness 
among Indonesian Muslims.23  
Although the Dutch government allowed most Islamic worship and 
family matters to be practiced unencumbered, it sought to impede such 
practices which related to increasing Islamic awareness and those which had 
the political potential for Islamic fanaticism.  The Dutch did so by putting 
limitations and controls on certain religious institutions.24 In the case of 
zakat, the Dutch Islamic policy allowed Muslims to partake, and in fact 
issued regulations, but these regulations were not for the purpose of 
promoting religious awareness among Muslims.  As discussed below, the 
policy was issued instead to eliminate the abuse of zakat distribution by 
colonial officials and to ensure that the personal liberty of any Muslim was 
not disturbed by compelling an individual to do his/her religious duty.  With 
this policy, a low level of Muslim piety regarding the zakat obligation could 
be engineered and maintained. 
                                           
19
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1335-36. Hisyam, supra note 11, at 117. 
20
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10 1347, 1369, 1371. 
21
 Suminto, supra note 2, at 4.   
22
 Id. at 29-30. 
23
 Id. at 4, 13. 
24
 Id. at 29-30. Suminto noted that the Dutch rule made continuous inspections over religious court, 
marriage and divorce, education, mosque funds, and pilgrimage to Mecca.  
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The fact that some native officials such as the regent (bupati), district 
chief (wedana), and head of the village (kepala desa) misused the zakat 
funds for their personal benefit created a bad impression in the eyes of the 
Netherlands East Indies government.  Realizing that such abuse by its own 
appointed officials might be a disincentive to political stability in the colony, 
the Netherlands East Indies government issued a regulation in 1866 
prohibiting those officials from involvement in the collection and 
distribution of zakat.25  However, this regulation was only applicable in 
Central Java, East Java, and Banten.  In Priangan and Cirebon, such 
regulations could not be imposed due to the existing vow of the Dutch 
government commissioner to not interfere with the earnings of penghulu 
(religious judges) in both regencies.26 With the support of native officials at 
their respective levels of government, the preceding condition in Priangan 
and Cirebon remained unchanged: the penghulu, naib, and lebe’ (who were 
mostly Indonesian and not necessarily Dutch appointees) went on collecting 
zakat from the people. 
As the impact of the 1866 regulation spread, the collection of zakat in 
Java divided into two primary methods.  In Priangan and Cirebon, there was 
active involvement of the penghulu, supported by native local officials, in 
the management of zakat.  In these regions, more zakat could be collected 
and more abuses by officials were consequently reported.  A contrary 
practice was evident however, in Banten, Central Java, and East Java.  In 
these areas, there was no longer any official zakat agency (amil or penghulu 
amil) which collected zakat from Indonesian Muslims.  As a result, zakat 
payment was low, as it was paid only by devout Muslims and mostly to non-
official agencies, such as religious teachers or Qur’anic village teachers.27  
The low amount of zakat collected in these areas had the effect of reducing 
the instances of abuse by zakat officials.28  The misuse of zakat funds was 
still evident, but government officials were no longer involved.  It is 
surmised that local religious officials or, more likely, informal religious 
leaders who were asked to distribute the zakat funds were probably claiming 
the largest proportion of zakat funds. 
                                           
25
 NASIHAT-NASIHA, supra note 10, at 1364, 1376; Steenbrink, supra note 3, at 230; Abdullah, supra 
note 4, at 57. 
26
 This vow was conveyed at the moment that the reorganization of Priangan residency was planned. 
The commissioner was afraid that there would be opposition to the plan of reorganization from religious 
officials if it would affect the existing practice of zakat collection in that region. See NASIHAT-NASIHAT, 
supra note 10, at 1348-49. 
27
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1330-31; Abdullah, supra note 4, at 57. In some cases, a 
little share of zakat was handed over to Muslim students (santri), the needy, and even sometimes to new 
converted Muslims (mu’allaf). 
28
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1368-70. 
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C. Snouck Hurgronje's Advice on Zakat Policy  
Although the diversion of a large portion of zakat to the zakat agency 
was considered a deviation from Islamic teachings, Snouck Hurgronje, who 
commenced his duty as a counselor for native affairs in 1889, advised the 
colonial government to treat it as a tolerable abuse.  For him, the meaning of 
“abuse” was defined in bureaucratic ethics rather than based on specific 
religious criteria.29  The misuse of zakat funds alone was acceptable30 so 
long as such misuse did not correspond with abuses of power, such as native 
bureaucrats or religious officials politically pressuring or threatening people 
to pay zakat.31 Only under such circumstances would formal abuse in the 
practice of zakat collection be considered to have taken place.  Snouck 
Hurgronje recognized that this kind of abuse could create major problems 
for many people and threaten political stability, and thus the colonial 
authorities had to prevent officials from using pressure or threats to force 
people to pay zakat.  It was for this reason that, so long as no government 
officials engaged in formal abuses, and no religious officials used threats to 
intimidate people into paying zakat, abuse in the collection of zakat per se 
remained more or less untouched.  
According to Snouck Hurgronje, the colonial government's main goal 
was to prevent zakat payment from being compulsory, even though its 
religious nature was obligatory.  He stressed however that any Muslim who 
desired to make zakat payments should not be prohibited from doing so.32 
For Snouck Hurgronje, it would be a mistake on the part of the colonial 
government to prohibit Muslims from making voluntary zakat payments.  He 
summarized the colonial policy on zakat as follows: 
To acknowledge and to protect religious practices wherever 
possible provided that [such] practices are considered 
indigenous, not because they are Islamic[.]33 . . . [Such 
regulation was necessary] to protect individual autonomy from 
any pressure in collecting zakat and fitrah, [in determining] 
their amount, or in choosing the agency that will allocate those 
religious funds.34  
                                           
29
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1355.  
30
 Id. at 1335. 
31
 One threat often used was, “If you do not pay me zakat, I will not be responsible for your funeral 
rites or those of your family, or assist when you marry.”  See Hisyam, supra note 11, at 117. 
32
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1323, 1348, 1359.  
33
 See id. at 1348. 
34
 See id. at 1377. 
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In Snouck Hurgronje's view, the religious burdens of Muslims, such as 
praying five times daily, fasting during Ramadhan, and making zakat 
payments, would eventually be rejected as overly strict and conservative and 
lead Muslims to disregard them.  For this reason, Snouck Hurgronje felt that 
to prohibit these religious practices would only result in strengthening 
religious fervor, and thus slow down the ongoing vanishing process of the 
observance of religious duties.35  
If Snouck Hurgronje did not propose the prohibition of zakat, how 
then did he advise the colonial government as to how to manage zakat?  It 
seemed that Snouck Hurgronje endorsed neither the prohibition nor the 
management of zakat.  In the case of zakat management by the state 
apparatus, Snouck Hurgronje was, in fact, against it.  An illustration from 
Purwokerto may elaborate his stance.  In 1901, Snouck Hurgronje was asked 
to give advice regarding the proposal to include zakat funds in municipal 
revenue (dana kotapraja), which could be used for broad social benefits 
such as the improvement of public utilities.  The expenditure of zakat funds 
for such a purpose was initially legalized in Purwokerto in 1897 in order to 
solve the problem of abuse in the collection of zakat by native local officials.  
Some Dutch officials, such as De Wollf van Westerrode, considered the idea 
brilliant and suggested its extensive application in other areas.36  
Snouck Hurgronje had six objections to the proposal.  His first 
objection was that such an approach was beyond the government’s 
responsibility.37  He added in his next letter that regulations such as 
Purwokerto’s contravened Islamic shari`a as well as Javanese custom.38  The 
second was the proposal would create a “new hidden tax,” and indirectly 
generate compulsion, via more political pressures on the people, to pay 
zakat.  The proposal could therefore provoke an accusation that the colonial 
government had arbitrarily changed Islamic Javanese institutions.  Snouck 
Hurgronje’s third objection was that the local officials would put more 
political pressure on communities to increase zakat collection from the 
people.  The fourth objection was that Snouck Hurgronje believed there was 
not enough evidence of the misuse of zakat funds to legitimize intervention 
by the local government in the management of zakat.  The fifth objection 
was that Muslims traditionally regarded zakat as a contribution given to 
appointed recipients; allowing zakat for other expenditures would 
contravene this tradition.  His sixth and final objection was that the proposal 
                                           
35
 SUMINTO, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
36
 NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1346-54. 
37
 Id. at 1352. 
38
 Id. at 1360. 
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contradicted existing Dutch policy, religious law, and local indigenous 
custom.39 By offering these objections, Snouck Hurgronje not only intended 
to prevent government officials from being labeled as officials of religion, 
but he was also clearly concerned with preventing the corruption of zakat 
funds. 
It appears on the surface Snouck Hurgronje intended merely to create 
an atmosphere of freedom of action.  Whilst elements of this are accurate, if 
we look carefully, we find that his ultimate objective was not only to 
eradicate the corruption of religious funds by government officials (either 
Dutch or native) and promote individual autonomy, but also, with the lack of 
official intervention into zakat collection, to prevent the growth of religious 
awareness among Muslims.  Snouck Hurgronje felt that Muslims would 
forgo zakat payments if not coerced to make them, because he realized that 
the religious reasons for paying zakat were not strongly embedded in the 
minds of Indonesian Muslims.40  By withdrawing the governmental 
apparatus for collecting zakat, Snouck Hurgronje's long-term goal, and the 
effect of his policies, was to ensure that the zakat obligation did not enable a 
growing religious consciousness amongst Muslims.  As discussed below, the 
policies of later governments did not follow, but significantly diverged from 
that of the colonial era.     
IV. THE NEW ORDER'S POLICY ON ZAKAT  
Newly independent Indonesia adopted the previous Dutch colonial 
strategy on zakat collection.  The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), 
which took the place of the Office for Indigenous Affairs, was established in 
January 1946 and set out to continue the colonial policy on the practice of 
zakat.  The task of this Ministry, among others, was to guarantee the freedom 
of people to observe their respective religious duties.41  With regard to zakat, 
MORA issued a circular letter stating that the Ministry would not interfere 
with its administration.42  MORA’s task was simply to let people freely 
observe their obligation to pay zakat and ensure that it was distributed 
properly, in accordance with religious teachings.43  This circular was the first 
sign of the Indonesian government’s stance towards zakat, which was simply 
a continuation of the policy of the previous colonial government.  It shows 
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that, at the outset, the government never intended to initiate the 
establishment of an official institution to centrally manage zakat in 
Indonesia, but rather to leave zakat administration in the hands of Muslim 
society.  
This inherited colonial policy was apparently adopted by the Sukarno 
government (the Old Order), but by the early years of the New Order a 
growing desire to make the Indonesian government responsible for the 
administration of zakat was apparent.  During the years of political transition 
(1966-1968) from the Old Order to the New Order regime, there was a re-
emerging demand for the legalization of the Jakarta Charter44 as an integral 
part of the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.  This attempt to amend the 
Constitution in the MPRS sessions during 1966, 1967, and 1968 again 
failed.45 In spite of this, the Jakarta Charter was still believed to have a great 
influence over the preamble of the 1945 Constitution as well as Article 29 of 
the same document, which would serve as a foundation for legislating 
shari`a law for Indonesian Muslims.  This belief is based on the Presidential 
Decree of July 5, 1959, that acknowledged the Jakarta Charter as a historical 
document of Indonesia, which inspired, and was linked in unity with, the 
1945 Constitution.46  
The belief that the Jakarta Charter continued to underpin Indonesian 
religious life led some Muslim leaders to call for the administration of zakat 
by the government apparatus.  Some prominent Muslim figures as well as 
Muslim leaders, who had key governmental positions (MORA in particular) 
formally proposed the legislation of zakat.  In July 1967, Saefuddin Zuhri, 
the then Minister of Religious Affairs, presented a draft Zakat Law to the 
legislature (DPRGR).  The draft was also sent to both the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Social Affairs for feedback.  Although the latter 
never responded, the Minister of Finance did reply with a suggestion that the 
zakat management would be better regulated by ministerial regulations 
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instead of by a statute.47  It was perhaps because of this suggestion that the 
legislature (DPRGR) chose not to pursue discussion of the draft Zakat Law 
that was presented by MORA.  This suggestion may have also inspired 
MORA a year later, under the leadership of Mohammad Dachlan, to issue a 
ministerial decree concerning the foundation of the Badan Amil Zakat (the 
zakat agency).48  This decree, which was issued in July 1968, arranged for a 
governmental zakat committee to be established at all administrative levels 
(both district and subdistrict) across the country. 
MORA's ministerial regulation on zakat did not last long.  It was 
indirectly annulled three months after it was issued by President Soeharto’s 
speech at the Isra’ Mi`raj (the Prophet’s Ascension) celebration on October 
26, 1968.  Instead of endorsing the establishment of official zakat agencies 
throughout the cities and towns of Indonesia, President Soeharto took over 
the administration of zakat by taking responsibility for the collection and 
distribution of zakat on a personal basis as a private citizen.49  In his official 
speech, President Soeharto stated: 
As the first step, I would like here to announce to all Indonesian 
Muslims that as a private citizen I am prepared to take charge of 
the massive national effort of zakat collection. . . .  From now 
on, I am personally willing to receive zakat payments made in 
the form of money orders from every single Muslim in the 
country.  God willing, I will regularly publicize to all citizens 
how much money I receive and I will be responsible for its 
expenditure.  I do really expect that this appeal will be fully 
paid attention and will have a positive feedback from the 
leaders and all Muslims.50  
Five days later, President Soeharto issued an instruction (surat perintah) 
assigning three high military officers to make all necessary preparations for 
a nationwide zakat collection drive.51  In addition, he sent a circular letter 
(surat edaran) to all public offices and local governments suggesting that 
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organizational apparatuses for zakat collection should be established in their 
respective workplaces.52 
The Minister initially assumed that Soeharto’s speech was consistent 
with the Ministerial Decree on zakat.  His reaction was to draft further, 
detailed rules for zakat collection that implemented Soeharto’s speech.53  
MORA only came to the realization that Soeharto objected to the Ministerial 
Decree on zakat after receiving a letter, dated December 16, 1968, from the 
Cabinet Secretary (Setkab).  As a result, in January 1969, compliant with the 
Cabinet Secretary’s letter, the Minister of Religion issued a ministerial 
instruction (No. 1 of 1969) for the deferment, or more precisely the 
revocation, of the ministerial decree on the zakat agency.  Following that 
ministerial instruction, MORA then circulated a letter (No. 3 of 1969) 
supporting President Soeharto’s scheme on the collection of zakat.  This 
letter announced that all results of zakat collection, instead of being sent to 
the Baitul Mal (Islamic Treasury) of the MORA, would be deposited in 
President Soeharto’s account at post offices throughout Indonesia. 
President Soeharto’s “offer” to create “a personally centralized 
system” was nothing more than a roundabout way of announcing impending 
changes to the mechanism already put in place by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs.  His speech changed the nature of zakat administration from an 
official, institutionalized procedure under the ministerial regulation, to an 
informal practice, concentrated on one individual.  
The operation of the zakat agency under the personal auspices of 
President Soeharto was maintained for only a few years.  In 1974, President 
Soeharto concluded his role as a national personal amil.  The last report of 
the President on zakat was delivered in his Idul Fitri (the breaking of the fast 
of Ramadan) speech on November 30, 1970.  The President reported that the 
collected zakat for the duration of two years amounted to Rp. 39.5 million in 
domestic currency and USD 2,473 in foreign currency.54  This meant that on 
average no more than Rp. 20 million per year was collected from muzakki 
(zakat payers) since the inception of the new system in 1968.  In President 
Soeharto’s eyes, this figure was certainly a small amount compared to the 
number of Muslims in Indonesia.  
President Soeharto justified his resignation from the amil position on 
this low response to his appeal for zakat collection.  This justification 
however probably camouflaged his true reasons for discontinuing his 
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obligations as amil.  Soeharto's ultimate goal was a political one: to thwart 
MORA’s implementation of the Jakarta Charter.  As his real objective was 
achieved, there was no need for President Soeharto to continue collecting 
zakat.  
President Soeharto was aware that prohibiting the establishment of an 
official zakat agency would create the impression that his regime was 
opposing Islam as a religion, and thus generate resistance from Muslim 
citizens.  On the other hand, Soeharto was in agreement with Snouck 
Hurgronje that forcing zakat payment could lead to political unrest.  For this 
reason, instead of wholeheartedly facilitating zakat payments, President 
Soeharto manipulated the administration of zakat by taking it over himself as 
a private citizen, thus making it casual and unofficial.  In doing so, President 
Soeharto sought to offer his moral support rather than actual structural 
assistance for the payment of zakat. 
Although President Soeharto ceased to be a national personal amil, his 
circular letter suggesting the foundation of an organizational apparatus to 
collect zakat in the respective host institutions of zakat agencies remained 
the legal basis for several government-sponsored or semi-autonomous zakat 
agencies in existence.  Despite the lack of judicial foundation or clear 
national guidance, a number of provincial zakat agencies continued to thrive 
during the New Order period.  In fact, with the exemplary model of 
President Soeharto as amil, a number of provincial administrations 
established government-sponsored zakat agencies or BAZIS (Badan Amil 
Zakat, Infak dan Sedekah).  The amount of provincial zakat agencies, in fact, 
increased during this time.55 Apart from the provincial government zakat 
agency (BAZ), a new type of private, community sponsored zakat 
organization (LAZ or the Non-Government Zakat Agency) emerged after 
1986 (e.g., the Bontang LNG Company, Pertamina).56 Zakat agencies 
created by Muslim community organizations (e.g., Dompet Dhuafa 
Republika, Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat, Yayasan Dana Sosial Al Falah, 
Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam) began to appear in the early 1990s.  
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V. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SNOUCK HURGRONJE'S AND SOEHARTO'S 
APPROACH TO ZAKAT 
As discussed above, Snouck Hurgronje’s colonial policy had the effect 
of indirectly making Muslims indifferent to their zakat obligation.  The 
colonial Islamic policy was designed to protect individual autonomy by 
allowing Muslims to individually determine the recipients of their zakat and 
to decide whether to pay zakat at all.  By bestowing upon Muslims such 
freedom of choice, Snouck Hurgronje assumed that they would overlook 
their religious duties.  In his eyes, Muslim religious obligations merely 
burdened Muslim life in the modern world.  He felt that zakat payments 
were primarily motivated by the belief that a failure to comply with the zakat 
obligation would result in receiving a punishment in the Hereafter.  Because 
this motive was not strongly embedded in the minds of Indonesian 
Muslims,57 Snouck Hurgronje’s minimal intervention approach seemed to 
impede a growing religious awareness among Indonesian Muslims.  
On the contrary, Soeharto’s government actively managed zakat 
collection by involving various state officials, including himself, in its 
collection.  Soeharto's government also used techniques such as promoting 
voluntary zakat payment, establishing an official agency to collect and 
distribute the zakat funds, managing its distribution amongst the 
beneficiaries, and releasing an instruction manual on zakat for Muslims.  
Although President Soeharto sought to adopt some of Snouck 
Hurgronje’s advice on zakat policy (initially, Soeharto viewed zakat as a 
religious duty over which the state should have no managerial duties),  
Soeharto failed to completely embrace Snouck Hurgronje’s policies.  
Soeharto’s and Snouck Hurgronje’s approaches to zakat policy were clearly 
different.  Although both shared the same goal of maintaining security and 
order in Islamic policy, Soeharto proactively promoted the practice of zakat 
by offering himself as a national amil, while Snouck Hurgronje downplayed 
it by removing any governmental infrastructure for its collection.  Soeharto’s 
willingness to personally manage the collection of zakat during the early 
years of his regime was seen as a symbolic example of his piety as a 
Muslim, and thus popularized both the practice of zakat and the zakat 
agency among Muslim citizens.  Assuming the promotion of zakat practice 
is some indication of support for Islamization, Soeharto’s approach strongly 
contradicted that of the colonial government. 
                                           
57
 See NASIHAT-NASIHAT, supra note 10, at 1351.   
SEPTEMBER 2006 ZAKAT LAWS IN MODERN INDONESIA 699 
  
Although Soeharto’s personal stance on Islamization was somewhat 
ambiguous (he refused the request of the MORA and the Indonesian Ulama 
Council (MUI) to once again act as an official national amil,58 but allowed 
the facilitation of zakat management by Ministerial Decrees59), his strategy 
had perhaps the unintended consequence of increasing the consciousness of 
many Muslims about their zakat obligation.  This growing devoutness 
coincided with the leaning of the New Order regime toward greater 
Islamization in the early 1990s.  In light of this, Soeharto was not a worthy 
disciple of Snouck Hurgronje, particularly on zakat policy.  
VI. THE LEGACY OF DUTCH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE POST-NEW ORDER 
ERA 
While some features of the colonial legacy are still observable in 
current Indonesia, much has changed.  This section will briefly describe the 
rivalry between different types of zakat agencies.  This rivalry is an example 
of the colonial legacy that still remains practiced in current Indonesia.  In 
addition, this section will discuss the differences between current-day 
Indonesia and the colonial era. 
It is clear that some remnants of the colonial Islamic policy continue 
to influence the independent Indonesian government.  Current Law 38/1999 
on the Administration of Zakat, which was passed by the Habibie 
government, is not focused on the religious nature of zakat.  Rather, it is 
present to facilitate the official establishment of both the Badan Amil Zakat 
(BAZ or the government sponsored zakat agency) and the Lembaga Amil 
Zakat (LAZ or the private zakat agency), and to supervise and oversee the 
correct use of zakat funds.  With this kind of policy, the Indonesian 
government has followed colonial practices on the management of zakat by 
putting a high priority on maintaining security and order. 
The presence of the various types of zakat agencies, or precisely the 
rivalry between different zakat agencies, is perhaps the most obvious feature 
of the colonial legacy that is still observable in the practice of zakat in 
current Indonesia.  Consistent with colonial rule, Muslims still have 
available many options of institutions to which they can voluntarily pay 
zakat; no single entity claims the absolute religious right to be the sole 
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collector of zakat from Muslim people.  Rivalries between zakat agencies 
exist today, similar to those that existed in the colonial era.  
The first rivalry existed during colonial times between religious 
officials (penghulu, lebe, or modin) on the one hand and the informal 
religious leaders (kiyai, ajengan, head of tarekat or Qur’anic teachers) on the 
other hand.60 The contest was over which agency was the legitimate amil or 
zakat agency.  The same contest can be seen, though in slightly different 
ways, between the BAZ and the LAZ.  The most salient case indicating this 
rivalry is worth mentioning here.  It was related to the preparation of the 
Zakat Bill, which was proposed by the MORA in 1999.  This Bill was 
designed to provide the BAZ with full legal arrangements, while the LAZ 
was not mentioned at all in such arrangements.  In so doing, the formal 
administration of zakat would be centralized into a single institution (i.e., the 
BAZ).  However, there was a strong criticism from the LAZ that its 
existence should be lawfully acknowledged.  Although the Zakat Law 
mentioned the existence of LAZ,61 its capacity was restricted.  In fact, of the 
thirty-three Articles mentioned in the Decree No. 581/1999 by the Minister 
of Religious Affairs, only four dealt with the LAZ.  It seemed that the 
MORA did not want to empower the role of LAZ, but rather sought to 
subordinate it into the lower structure of the BAZ as the Unit Pengumpulan 
Zakat (UPZ or Zakat Collection Unit).  
Despite the existence of some similarities, much has changed since 
colonial times.  The protection of religious liberty, one of the foremost 
objectives of the colonial Islamic policy, has been gradually lessened in 
recent decades, since Indonesia’s independence.  Current developments of 
zakat practice in post-Soeharto Indonesia show the enhancement of religious 
awareness in Indonesia towards the obligation of zakat payment.  Although 
no punishment is given for zakat evasion, the implementation of zakat policy 
in some situations has been compulsory.  The personal liberty in the practice 
of zakat previously enjoyed by Indonesian Muslims is no longer available in 
some circumstances.  A number of state offices and private companies, for 
example, have unilaterally levied zakat payments from their employees on a 
monthly basis.  This practice has become much more prevalent in certain 
regions of Indonesia where provincial or district governments have enacted 
compulsory regulations regarding the practice of zakat.  
Additionally, there have been efforts to further reverse the de-
Islamization agenda that was intrinsic to colonial Islamic policy.  The 
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enactment of the Law on Zakat Management in 1999, the establishment of 
the National Board of Zakat Agency (BAZNAS) in 2000, and other technical 
regulations issued by MORA concerning zakat payments are evidence that 
the Islamization of Indonesia through zakat payments is on the rise.  Many 
zakat agencies, both government supported and privately sponsored, are 
intent on amending the current Zakat Law in order to make the payment of 
zakat obligatory.62  Although this process is still far from complete, current 
developments in the post-Soeharto era reveal that modern-day Indonesian 
policy has slowly diverged from the colonial policy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that the Dutch Islamic policy had only 
minor influence on the administration of zakat.  It reveals how the Dutch 
Islamic policy, which was largely designed by Snouck Hurgronje and 
emphasized the protection of religious liberty, has slowly faded.  The 
minimum state intervention into religious affairs during the colonial era has 
transformed dramatically.  The Indonesian government from time to time 
moved away from colonial policies.  The Dutch Islamic policy, which was 
religiously neutral in nature, has significantly changed, especially since the 
New Order era.  Through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Indonesian 
government increased its role in managing matters related to Islam and 
Muslim society, including the payment of zakat.  Indeed, President Soeharto 
himself, who was purportedly practicing Snouck Hurgronje's advice on 
Islamic policy, actively facilitated the collection of zakat.  This certainly 
contradicted the Dutch Islamic policy, which underscored non-government 
engagement into the administration of zakat. 
What is more, since the fall of the New Order regime, the practice of 
zakat in Indonesia has gradually shifted from merely being an act of 
religious piety to being a means for establishing an Islamic socio-political 
and economic system in Indonesia.  The present condition of the voluntary 
and decentralized practice of zakat in Indonesia could easily give way to a 
compulsory and centralized form of zakat collection, where the government- 
sponsored zakat agency would be the sole zakat collector and where the 
government would not leave zakat payments up to the conscience of Muslim 
individuals.  If these projected developments occur, the legacy of colonial 
policy over the practice of zakat in Indonesia would be virtually eliminated. 
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